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Abstract
An authentication service is one of the the most fundamental building blocks for providing
communication security. In this paper, we present the MOCA (MObile Certiﬁcate Authority)
key management framework designed to provide authentication service for ad hoc wireless net-
works. MOCA is a distributed certiﬁcate authority (CA) based on threshold cryptography.
We present a set of guidelines for a secure conﬁguration of threshold cryptography to main-
tain strong security. MOCA utilizes a carefully selected set of mobile nodes to function as a
collective certiﬁcate authority while the MOCA nodes are kept anonymous. Equipped with a
novel routing protocol designed to support the unique communication pattern for certiﬁcation
traﬃc, MOCA achieves high availability without sacriﬁcing security. Both the security of the
framework and the operational performance is evaluated with rigorous analysis and extensive
simulation study.
1 Introduction
A mobile wireless ad hoc network is formed by a group of mobile nodes with wireless communi-
cation capability without support from any stationary communication infrastructure. This unique
infrastructure-less nature enables ad hoc networking technology to provide instant network deploy-
ment in situations where no communication infrastructure is available. Many proposed applications
for ad hoc networks, including battleﬁeld communication, disaster recovery and emergency rescue,
involve mission critical situations where the security of the communication in the network must be
guaranteed. Given these security requirements, the lack of adequate security support can easily
negate the utility of an ad hoc network in practice.
Security begins with reliable authentication. Other security services, including access control,
auditing, and authorization, all rely on an authentication service to provide reliable identiﬁcation
of participants. A well-established way to provide an authentication service in distributed systems
is public key cryptography [24], where an entity is represented with a pair of keys. The public
key is used as the ID of the entity while the private key is used to prove the ownership of the
public key. The public key is disseminated in the form of a digital certiﬁcate that binds the
entity’s identity to the entity’s public key. The successful use of public key cryptography requires
an eﬃcient mechanism to manage such digital certiﬁcates. One popular example is Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [17]. PKI is usually designed around a centralized and trusted component
called the Certificate Authority (CA), which binds and unbinds entities to their public keys by
issuing and revoking digital certiﬁcates, and also functions as the repository for active digital
certiﬁcates.
However, it is questionable if the centralized CA-based PKI for wired networks is directly
applicable to ad hoc networks, where diﬀerent characteristics invalidate many assumptions that
traditional PKI relies on. First, nodes in an ad hoc network are more vulnerable compared to wired
hosts. Second, network topology and connectivity can rapidly change in ad hoc networks due to
the mobility of nodes and the use of a wireless medium, making it diﬃcult to maintain availability
to a mobile CA. Therefore, an ad hoc key management framework must be designed to operate
under these unique characteristics.
To address the challenges of ad hoc environments, the CA’s functionality can be distributed to
multiple nodes in such a manner that the CA stays secure even when some portion of the respon-
sible nodes are compromised or become unavailable [29]. Most approaches in this direction rely on
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a cryptographic technique called threshold cryptography [9]. However, there is an inherent tension
between the two most important goals of a distributed CA: strong security and high availability.
Careless focus on strong security can easily make the CA unavailable or too costly to be main-
tained. Similarly, a blind eﬀort to increase the availability of a distributed CA can easily lead to
a security breach of the CA. Therefore, an ad hoc key management framework must be designed
as a comprehensive system addressing all the challenges in a uniﬁed framework.
The contribution of our work is the design and implementation of the MOCA (MObile Cer-
tificate Authority) ad hoc key management framework. MOCA uses threshold cryptography to
distribute the CA functionality to multiple nodes. MOCA diﬀers from other distributed CA ap-
proaches for ad hoc networks by limiting MOCA nodes to a small but more secure subset of the
nodes in an ad hoc network. The distributed CA is then made available with novel communication
support designed for the unique pattern that arises from the access to any threshold quorum sys-
tem. These novel design characteristics enable MOCA to simultaneously provide strong security
and high availability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst discuss the general challenge of ad hoc key
management in Section 2. Section 3 describes the MOCA framework in detail. We then analyze
the security of the MOCA framework with our novel security metric in Section 4. In Section 5,
the eﬃciency of communication support in the MOCA framework is illustrated with an extensive
simulation study and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks
The key role of a certiﬁcate authority is to act as the trust anchor for the system. As long as
the CA is trusted, any certiﬁcates issued by the CA are universally trusted. Therefore, in any
CA-based PKI, the security of the whole system relies on the security and availability of the CA.
Traditionally in wired networks, a CA is deployed as a single host (or a cluster of hosts with a single
front-end) that is powerful enough to handle all requests from the network and heavily guarded
physically and electronically. Although the single CA can still be a bottleneck and also a single
point of failure, it is relatively easy to protect a wired host from attacks and failures. There are
many such CAs in operation for the Internet and they all appear as a single site to the rest of the
Internet [8, 22, 23].
However, there are three signiﬁcant diﬀerences that distinguish ad hoc networks from any other
type of networks. First, nodes are assumed to be mobile and, therefore, lightweight and open to
physical attacks. Second, the topology of an ad hoc network can be very unstable due to the
mobility. Third, communication can only use the wireless medium, which is inherently lossy and
error-prone. Infrastructure-based wireless networks like wireless LANs and cellular networks share
the last challenge but the ﬁrst two are unique to ad hoc networks. These diﬀerences call for a new
way of providing a security service for an ad hoc environment.
2.1 Threat Model
The threats that can exist in an ad hoc network must drive the design of a key management
framework for ad hoc networks. Attacks can be classiﬁed into two categories: active and passive
. Active attacks involve behaviors such as manipulating packets, attacking other mobile nodes,
or jamming the wireless medium. Passive attacks only rely on overhearing the traﬃc without
disrupting network operation. Passive attacks are harder to detect compared to active attacks
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with visible anomalies. We focus our attention on two active attacks on a distributed PKI: Routing
layer attacks and Directed attacks on CA nodes.
• Routing Layer Attacks - Malicious nodes can disrupt routing behavior by advertising false
routing information, injecting incorrect routing packets, or even luring all packets and drop-
ping them [2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 27]. Some routing layer attacks can be used to mount a
simple denial-of-service attack if the attacker can either block or reroute all of the victim’s
packets. The MOCA framework uses a set of routing protocols based on the intelligent use
of limited ﬂooding that are immune to most routing layer attacks.
• Directed Attacks on CA nodes - When the attacker can discover either the identity or the
location of CA nodes, the attacker can focus its resource in attacking only the CA nodes.
The MOCA framework is designed to minimize the possibility of the CA nodes getting com-
promised. MOCA nodes are only selected from more secure and capable nodes and their
identities are hidden so that an adversary cannot direct an attack on the MOCA nodes.
Radio frequency jamming is an active attack mounted at the physical layer of the network where
an attacker transmits a high power signal over the spectrum, eﬀectively jamming the band. This
is a low-level denial-of-service attack and defense against it is out of scope of this paper.
Passive attacks include eavesdropping and traﬃc analysis. The MOCA framework is not vul-
nerable to eavesdropping since all information contained in communication between a client and
the MOCA framework is public. On the other hand, traﬃc analysis may provide the attackers
with sensitive information about the conﬁguration of the framework. However, it is unclear how
feasible a traﬃc analysis attack can be in ad hoc environments since traﬃc analysis requires a large
amount of attackers’ resources [15]. While there are known approaches to deter traﬃc analysis in
wired networks [5, 6, 20], it is questionable if any of these approaches can be directly applied to ad
hoc environments due to their excessive communication and computation overhead. Therefore, the
design of our MOCA framework focuses on the two speciﬁed active attacks. Based on this threat
model, we next present a set of requirements for eﬀective ad hoc key management frameworks and
examine existing approaches based on these criteria.
2.2 Three Goals for Ad Hoc Key Management
A successful key management framework for ad hoc networks must satisfy three fundamental
requirements: fault tolerance, security, and availability. These terms are sometimes used inter-
changeably, mainly because they are not independent of each other. To avoid confusion, we ﬁrst
clearly deﬁne these terms.
• Fault Tolerance: The goal of fault tolerance is to maintain correct operation in the presence of
faulty nodes. We restrict the deﬁnition of faulty to non-malicious. Fault tolerance is related
to availability because as long is the service can tolerate the faults, such faults do not impact
service availability.
• Security: Acting as the trust anchor for the whole network, a key management framework
must be designed to be resilient against all levels of attacks and robust enough to withstand
a relatively high fraction of compromised nodes.
• Availability: Traditionally, the term availability has been used in conjunction with fault
tolerance. However, in ad hoc networks, availability is also highly dependent on network
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connectivity. In wired networks, if the service is online, it is by deﬁnition available since
connectivity between clients and the service is usually guaranteed. In ad hoc networks,
clients may not be able to contact an operational service due to unstable and rapidly changing
connectivity.
These three requirements are not independent of each other. For that reason, careless attempts
to improve any one aspect may aﬀect the others adversely. For example, a simple and very ef-
fective way to improve fault tolerance is to replicate the CA. However, this approach makes the
overall framework more vulnerable. Interactions between these requirements must be throughly
understood before designing a distributed key management framework. To understand these inter-
actions, we discuss current approaches to providing PKI in ad hoc networks and how each approach
tries to satisfy the three requirements.
2.3 Existing Approaches
The simplest approach to providing CA functionality in an ad hoc network is to assign a single
node to be the CA. The success of this scheme depends on that single CA node. Since failure
of one node breaks the entire system, fault tolerance is very low. Similarly, vulnerability is high
since an adversary only needs to compromise one node to acquire the secret key. Finally, given the
expected mobility and unpredictability of ad hoc networks, client nodes may not be able to reach
the CA in a timely fashion, making availability very unpredictable. Therefore, it is clear that a
single CA cannot eﬀectively service a whole ad hoc network.
A higher fault tolerance can be achieved by replicating a fully functional CA on multiple nodes.
With r replicas, the system can withstand (r - 1) failures because the CA is available as long as
there is at least one operational CA. Availability is also improved since a client node has a better
chance of reaching one of r CAs. Unfortunately, the security of the framework is now even lower
than the single node CA scenario. An adversary needs only to compromise one of the r CA nodes to
acquire the CA’s secret key and so compromise the whole system. The problem of using replicated
CAs stems from the fact that each replica has full knowledge of the system secret. Therefore, using
replicated CAs is not applicable in ad hoc networks where nodes are more vulnerable.
Wu et al. ﬁrst proposed the use of threshold cryptography to distribute a CA’s functionality
over multiple nodes for higher fault tolerance [25]. However, their approach is aimed at large-scale
wired networks like the Internet and is not directly applicable to ad hoc environments. Zhou
and Haas adapted Wu’s approach into ad hoc networks [29], stating the problem clearly but only
presenting the conceptual design at a very high level. While Zhou and Haas laid out the basic
concepts for an ad hoc distributed CA, they missed the important aspects of the availability of the
distributed CA in the ad hoc network and the communication overhead from accessing the CA.
Kong et al. address the availability issue by making every node in the network share CA
functionality [18]. A client only needs to contact any k nodes to get a certiﬁcation service. Assuming
there are more than k nodes in a client’s one hop neighborhood, the client can get a certiﬁcation
service cheaply by using a single one-hop broadcast for the request. While this solution addresses
availability and fault tolerance, it compromises the security of the system. In general, the gap
between k and n in secret sharing schemes deﬁnes the security of the system. k can be anywhere
between 1 and n. As k approaches n, thus shrinking the gap between k and n, the system becomes
more secure because an adversary needs to compromise more nodes to penetrate the system.
However, if k is too large, the system becomes less available to clients and also less tolerant to
faults. When k approaches 1, increasing the gap between k and n, the eﬀect is reversed and the
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system becomes more available but less secure. Kong chose to keep k relatively small to address
the availability problem and ended up with a vulnerable system where any adversary only needs
to compromise a small fraction of nodes in the network to collapse the service.
Another notable scheme is proposed by Hubaux et al. [14], which is later extended in [3]. In
their scheme, every node acts as its own CA, similar to the PGP [30] “Web of Trust” model. The
main diﬀerence between PGP and their scheme is that there is no longer a well-known certiﬁcate
directory where all certiﬁcates are stored. Instead, every node in the network carries a part of the
certiﬁcate directory. In PGP, when two users wish to authenticate each other, they must search
the certiﬁcate directory for a chain of certiﬁcates that links both users. In Hubaux’s scheme, this
problem is transformed into ﬁnding an intersecting point between the certiﬁcate chains carried by
each user. While their approach is practical for purely self-organized networks, it cannot provide
a high assurance authentication service as provided by the certiﬁcate authority in PKI.
3 MOCA
In this section, we present the MOCA (MObile Certiﬁcate Authority) ad hoc key management
framework. MOCA uses threshold cryptography to divide and distribute the CA functionality to
multiple nodes. MOCA nodes are picked carefully based on their characteristics such as physical
security, computational capability, and trustworthiness. Based on these criteria, a relatively small
set of nodes is selected to function as the distributed CA. These MOCA nodes operate in the
network without revealing their identity as the CA nodes. Careful MOCA node selection and
anonymity help achieve a high level of security for the MOCA framework. Usually, the price
for having a small set of CA nodes is reduced availability and higher communication overhead.
MOCA addresses this problem by employing a suite of specially designed routing protocols for
eﬃcient communication support for the certiﬁcation traﬃc.
3.1 Using Threshold Cryptography
MOCA employs k-out-of-n threshold cryptosystem to divide the CA’s master private key to n
distributed CA nodes [9, 21]. The CA’s master private key is divided to n pieces and any k of
such pieces can be used to reconstruct the master private key. There are three important factors
to consider when employing threshold cryptography: (1) Who will be given a secret share? (2)
Who will distribute the secret shares? And, (3) How to handle compromised secret share holders?
Next, we discuss each of these questions in detail.
3.1.1 Choice of MOCA Nodes
Any number of nodes between one and the total number of nodes in the network can be selected as
MOCA nodes. However, selecting a relatively small fraction of nodes in the network is desirable.
Intuitively, the crypto threshold k cannot be set too high since it causes every certiﬁcation request
to generate excessive communication overhead. With the crypto threshold value ﬁxed, increasing
the number of MOCA nodes widens the gap between k and n, allowing attackers to more easily
locate enough MOCA nodes to compromise and steal the master private key. Therefore, n must
be kept to a relatively small value compared to the total number of nodes in the network.
There are many possible ways to select the MOCA nodes. While most research in ad hoc
networking has implicitly treated all nodes to be identical, it is more likely that an ad hoc network
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contains several types of mobile nodes that are diﬀerent from one another in power capacity, trans-
mission range, computational capacity, and security. Therefore, any security service or framework
should utilize this potential heterogeneity. For example, consider a battleﬁeld scenario with a battle
group consisting of infantry soldiers, platoon commanders’ jeeps, company commanders’ command
vehicles, artillery vehicles, transport vehicles, and tanks. All of these mobile nodes have diﬀerent
rank, power, computation capacity, transmission range, and level of physical security. In such a
case, it would be wise to pick nodes with higher ranks, more power, more capabilities and stronger
security to provide a security service. While it may not be necessary to exploit this potential het-
erogeneity to enhance basic ad hoc routing, certainly this heterogeneity can be used to help improve
network security by endowing more secure nodes with sensitive information. Similar situations can
be imagined in emergency rescue operations, disaster recovery, or any other scenarios where ad
hoc networks can play a critical role. In general, knowledge of such heterogeneity should be used
to determine the nodes that share the responsibility of the CA. Once the number of MOCA nodes,
n, is chosen, the MOCA framework selects n mobile nodes with (1) highest trustworthiness, (2)
highest physical security, (3) most computational capacity, and (4) most power as MOCA nodes.
Once the MOCA nodes are selected, their identity must be kept secret. Maintaining the
anonymity of MOCA nodes is crucial to achieve strong security. Intuitively, it is harder, if not
impossible, for an adversary to locate anonymous MOCA nodes and compromise them. This forces
the adversary to invest far more resources trying to compromise the key management framework
and reduces the chance for successful attacks. With routing layer support for anonymous communi-
cation and careful design of protocol message contents, the MOCA framework provides certiﬁcation
service anonymously.
3.1.2 Oﬀ-line Key Dealer
Once a set of nodes is selected to serve as MOCA nodes, the nodes are conﬁgured by an oﬀ-line key
dealer that does not participate in the ad hoc network operation. The oﬀ-line key dealer generates
the CA’s master key pair, divides the private key using threshold cryptography, distributes the key
shares to selected MOCA nodes and then goes oﬄine and stays out of the network. This oﬀ-line
key dealer is a crucial component to the framework’s overall security since it holds the full secret
key of the CA. Therefore, it is critical to protect the oﬀ-line key dealer from attackers.
Alternative approaches that do not require such an oﬀ-line key dealer use online election of
CA nodes. Such online election can be performed when more than a threshold number of CA
nodes become disabled or there is a network conﬁguration change. Kong et al. uses online election
to make the distributed CA self-contained within an ad hoc network [18]. In their approach,
a group of neighboring nodes can promote another node to become a CA node with a proper
key share. However, this design decision opens the door for a serious security breach since it is
relatively easy to compromise enough nodes to steer the online CA election to beneﬁt attackers.
Also, given the problem of Sybil attacks, it is impossible to prevent impersonation in a open
distributed system without clearly distinguished centralized authentication support [7]. Therefore,
Kong et al.’s proposal is also open to Sybil attacks where an adversary node may acquire multiple
identities to impersonate enough nodes to acquire key shares and reconstruct the CA’s full private
key, resulting in the total compromise of the framework. Defense against Sybil attacks in ad hoc
networks is still an open research problem [19]. Therefore, MOCA does not allow online election
of new CA nodes in the interest of maintaining strong security.
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3.2 Message Format
Hiding the identity of the MOCA nodes is another important factor for strong security. It is also
crucial that no message exchanged between a client and the MOCA nodes carry any identifying
information about the MOCA nodes. There are two types of messages that can be exchanged
between the MOCA framework and client nodes: certiﬁcation requests from a client and certiﬁca-
tion replies to a client. All messages are designed so that the identities of MOCA nodes can stay
hidden.
3.2.1 Certiﬁcation Request (CREQ)
A certiﬁcation request message is sent from a client node to a group of MOCA nodes. All MOCA
nodes that receive the request message must reply accordingly. A certiﬁcation request message
contains the following information.
1. Client ID - the ID of the client node
2. Type - A certiﬁcate request, a revocation request, or a certiﬁcate retrieval request.
3. Payload - A certiﬁcation request contains the public key of the requesting node. A revocation
request contains the public key of the requesting node. A certiﬁcate retrieval request contains
the ID of a node whose certiﬁcate is being requested.
4. Signature - The whole certiﬁcation request message is signed with the requesting node’s
private key. Note that this key may not yet be certiﬁed at this point.
3.2.2 Certiﬁcation Reply (CREP)
When a MOCA node receives a certiﬁcation request message from a client, it returns a certiﬁcation
reply message containing the following information.
1. Client ID - The ID of the requesting node
2. Payload - For a certiﬁcation request, a partial signature over the digital certiﬁcate is sent
back. For a revocation request, a revocation certiﬁcate is created and sent back. For a
certiﬁcate retrieval request, a digital certiﬁcate is sent back if available at the MOCA node.
Note that a CREP message does not contain any information about the replying MOCA node
to keep them anonymous.
3.3 Communication Support for the Certiﬁcation Traﬃc
The design decision to limit the number of MOCA nodes in a network creates a problem for
availability. Since there are a limited number of MOCA nodes to choose from, a client node
may have diﬃculty contacting enough MOCA nodes. Without any attention, this can also easily
put excessive communication overhead on the network while causing network-wide congestion and
wasting the scarce resources of mobile nodes. The key idea of our solution lies in the observation of
a novel communication pattern generated by the MOCA framework. When a client contacts a set
of MOCA nodes for a certiﬁcation service, it generates a communication pattern of one-to-many-to-
one. The client needs to contact k MOCA nodes and must receive k independent replies. We named
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this communication pattern manycast and performed an extensive study of its characteristics [4].
This transactional manycast communication pattern may look similar to multicast but there are
several diﬀerences. First, multicast can only handle the ﬁrst half of a manycast transaction. The
many-to-one part cannot be managed by a multicast protocol. Second, in multicast, a source
wishes to contact all members of the multicast group whereas in manycast, the source wishes to
contact a ﬁxed size subset of server nodes.
When designing a protocol to support manycast communication, there are two questions to
answer: (1) How to choose and contact k nodes from the set of n without knowing their individual
identities? And (2) What is the most eﬃcient way to contact and receive individual replies from
them? Among the suite of manycast routing protocols proposed in [4], only two are appropriate for
the MOCA framework: flooding and scoped-flooding, since only these two approaches can maintain
the servers’ anonymity.
A client without any knowledge about the network or MOCA nodes must ﬂood a certiﬁcation
request (CREQ) the ﬁrst time. Every MOCA node that receives the CREQ replies with a certi-
ﬁcation reply (CREP) generated with their secret share. A CREP message is unicast back to the
client using the reverse path created by the CREQ message. When a client receives CREP mes-
sages, the client records the hopcount of each reply. These hopcounts show the distance between
the client and the MOCA node that sent the reply messages. When the client needs to send the
next CREQ message, the information in this hopcount cache is ﬁrst examined to ﬁnd out whether
it is possible to reduce the scope of ﬂooding controlled by the TTL (Time-To-Live) ﬁeld in the
CREQ message while reaching enough MOCA nodes. With scoped ﬂooding, the MOCA framework
achieves highly eﬃcient communication support for certiﬁcation traﬃc while keeping the MOCA
nodes secure and anonymous. A detailed performance study of manycast routing in the MOCA
framework is presented in Section 5.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we examine the security of the MOCA framework. Threshold cryptography used
to distribute the CA functionality has built-in support for security and fault tolerance. More
speciﬁcally, an adversary must compromise at least k MOCA nodes to compromise the CA. As
long as there are k non-faulty MOCA nodes in operation, the framework can provide service.
However, deployment of a distributed CA with threshold cryptography requires careful attention
to ﬁner details. We ﬁrst examine the basic parameters and their relationship to the security of the
framework and then discuss some additional precautions required for secure deployment.
4.1 Threshold Cryptography Parameters
The conﬁguration of the MOCA framework is determined by the total number of nodes in the
network, M, the crypto threshold for secret reconstruction, k, and the number of MOCA nodes, n.
While M cannot be chosen a priori, the crypto threshold, k, can be selected and it is important
to understand the eﬀects of the selected value of k. k can be chosen between 1 (a single MOCA
node must be contacted for a certiﬁcation service) and n (all MOCA nodes must be contacted for
a certiﬁcation service). Setting k to a higher value has the eﬀect of making the system more secure
since k is the number of MOCA nodes an adversary needs to compromise to penetrate the system.
But at the same time, a higher k value makes clients contact more MOCA nodes for certiﬁcation
service, which may result in higher communication overhead. Therefore, the choice of k must strike
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a balance between the two conﬂicting goals by being small enough to not overwhelm the network
but large enough to withstand attacks.
The number of MOCA nodes, n, is determined by the characteristics of the nodes in the network
and is determined before the MOCA framework is deployed. n can be changed to a new value but
it requires costly intervention of the oﬀ-line key dealer. In a threshold system, n deﬁnes the limits
of the system as an upper bound for k since 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Given a ﬁxed value of k, a larger n increases
the availability of the whole framework since a client can choose from a larger set of MOCA nodes.
On the other hand, (n - k) is the maximum number of faults the framework can survive, so a larger
n also means higher fault tolerance.
4.2 Measuring the Security Level for Distributed CAs
Assuming the distributed CA nodes are anonymous and an adversary cannot discover their identity,
the best approach for the adversary is to compromise as many nodes as possible in a given amount
of time, hoping that enough CA nodes are included among the compromised nodes. The following
simple combinatoric equation captures this situation.
Security Level = 1.0−
∑c
i=k
(
n
i
)(
M−n
c−i
)
(
M
c
) ,
This formula measures the probability that an attacker fails to compromise the distributed CA
given that the attacker can compromise at most c nodes in a window of time. If an attacker is
capable of pinpointing attacks only on the CA nodes, the attack always succeeds as long as c ≥ k.
Therefore, it is crucial to keep the CA nodes anonymous, limiting attackers to random attacks.
Currently, there are only two concrete designs proposed for distributed CAs [18, 26]. In Kong’s
approach, every node serves as a CA node. Therefore, it is impossible to hide the identities of
CA nodes and application of this metric always yields a zero security level as long as c ≥ k. In
contrast, MOCA hides the CA nodes’ identities as well as limits their number. Therefore, the
best chance an adversary has to compromise the system is by randomly compromising as many
nodes as possible. For example, the security level of a 30-node MOCA framework with k = 5 and
c = 10 in a 150-node network is calculated to 0.97, which shows that it is not very likely that this
conﬁguration of the MOCA framework will be compromised.
This metric also reveals another important conﬁguration pitfall that can be easily overlooked:
the meaning of the gap between k and n. Based on the discussions so far, a large enough k and
much larger n appear to be the right choice for conﬁguration parameters. However, if the gap
between k and n is too big, the security of the framework degrades. If c < k, the framework is
secure by design since no adversary can compromise enough MOCA nodes. However, if c ≥ k, it
is possible for an adversary to compromise the framework. Therefore, it helps to limit the MOCA
nodes to be a small set of more secure and capable nodes, which makes it harder for the adversary
to locate and compromise enough MOCA nodes. Figure 1 (a) illustrates one example. Out of 150
total nodes in the network, 10, 30, 50, 100, and 120 nodes are selected as MOCA nodes with a
ﬁxed crypto threshold k = 10. The ﬁve curves in the graph display cases of n = 120, 100, 50, 30,
and 10 from left to right. As the attacker’s capacity c increases, all curves monotonically decrease
from 1.0 to 0.0. However, the rate of decrease is much higher for curves with a larger n. This
illustrates the eﬀect of the gap between k and n, which shows that a too large n can weaken the
conﬁguration of the overall framework.
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4.3 Selection of MOCA nodes
As discussed in the previous section, the number of MOCA nodes, n, in a network should be limited
to a reasonable number. It may seem counterintuitive to limit the number of MOCA nodes, which
may reduce the availability and the fault tolerance achieved by the distributed nature of MOCA.
For example, in a 300 node network, an operator may have a choice of selecting 200 random nodes or
30 nodes with higher physical security to support CA functionality. Blindly comparing the number
of MOCA nodes in the system, the ﬁrst choice seems better because it has more MOCA nodes in
the network, improving fault tolerance and availability. However, by guaranteeing a higher level
of security of the 30 MOCA nodes in the second case, compromising them becomes much harder
than compromising the randomly selected MOCA nodes in the ﬁrst case, hence making the second
case more secure against adversaries. It is possible that an ad hoc network does not have enough
heterogeneity among the nodes, which may make it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to choose MOCA
nodes based on heterogeneity. In such cases, we can fall back to random selection of MOCA nodes.
However, the level of security will decrease since there is no guarantee on the security of each
MOCA node.
The next question is how to pick the best subset of nodes to serve as the MOCA nodes. As
discussed in Section 3.1.1, MOCA nodes are selected based on their characteristics and limited
to more secure, more capable, and more trustworthy nodes. This design decision makes it more
diﬃcult for an adversary to compromise the MOCA framework, in eﬀect decreasing the adversary’s
attack capacity c. Figure 1 (b) illustrates an example. The three curves display the security levels
for the conﬁgurations with c = 50, 30, and 20. The horizontal line at the security level 1.0 is for
the case of c = 5, where the framework is completely secure since c < k. The curves move to the
right as the adversary’s attack capacity is decreased, making the system more secure. A careful
selection of MOCA nodes can indeed help maintain a higher security level.
5 Communication Performance Evaluation
The focus of our performance evaluation is to measure the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of MOCA
communication support. We show that the MOCA framework can maintain a secure distributed
CA without incurring prohibitive communication overhead by employing scoped-ﬂooding. Eﬀec-
tiveness while measured by the success ratio of certiﬁcation requests. Given a crypto threshold k,
more than k replies from MOCA nodes makes a certiﬁcation request successful. The success ratio
must be kept at a high level under all circumstances to provide useful service. However, a high
success ratio should not come at the price of excessive overhead that can aﬀect normal network
operation. Overhead is measured by the number of messages transmitted per certiﬁcation request.
The simulation results show that scoped-ﬂooding achieves a very high success ratio comparable to
pure ﬂooding with an acceptable packet overhead.
5.1 Simulation Set-Up
We implement our certiﬁcation protocols in the ns-2 network simulator [1]. 150 mobile nodes are
set up within either 1km by 1km area or 2km by 2km area. Out of 150 nodes, 30 nodes are
randomly selected as MOCA nodes. 30 MOCA nodes represent 20% of the total nodes, which
we believe provide a reasonable number of MOCA nodes to support the given ad hoc network.
Each simulation is run for 600 seconds. Detailed simulation parameters are listed in the Table 6.
The certiﬁcation request pattern includes 100 non-MOCA nodes, each making 10 certiﬁcation
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requests randomly distributed through the simulation timeline, for a total of 1000 certiﬁcation
requests. Each requesting node makes one request per minute on average during the course of the
simulation. This is roughly 100 requests per minute and we believe that this is a reasonable number
if not too stressful to the framework. Assuming each certiﬁcation request precedes initiation of a
new secure communication, starting one secure communication session per node per minute should
be more than adequate for ordinary mobile nodes. Node movement follows the random waypoint
mobility model implemented by Yoon et al. [28]. Data points in the graphs are averaged over ﬁve
diﬀerent mobility scenarios with identical simulation parameters. We measure the performance of
scoped-ﬂooding with pure ﬂooding as the baseline since they are the only anonymous manycast
routing protocols available. Pure ﬂooding always ﬂoods the network with certiﬁcation requests,
potentially incurring high overhead. In comparison, scoped-ﬂooding uses a limited ﬂooding of
certiﬁcation requests with a reduced TTL value when there is enough cached information. Scoped-
ﬂooding only falls back to pure ﬂooding when there is not enough information in the hopcount
cache. For all simulations, we control two parameters that aﬀect the performance of the MOCA
framework: the crypto threshold k and the mobility of nodes as measured in maximum speed.
• Crypto Threshold k - k is the minimum number of CREPs required for a client to reconstruct
the MOCA’s full signature and render the certiﬁcation request successful. If k is set to
a small number, a client only needs to collect a small number of k partial signatures to
continue. Therefore, with a small k, the success ratio increases and the packet overhead
decreases. A large k value makes attacks more diﬃcult, but the burden on clients and the
packet overhead increase since a client needs to contact a large number of MOCA nodes for
a certiﬁcation request.
• Mobility (Maximum Speed) - As nodes move faster, it becomes harder to maintain connec-
tivity to enough MOCA nodes. When scoped-ﬂooding is used, the client relies on its previous
knowledge about the number of nearby MOCA nodes. Under high mobility, this knowledge
remains valid only for a short period and scoped ﬂooding fails more frequently, resulting in
decreased success ratio.
Our simulation results show consistent patterns throughout diﬀerent pause times, speed pat-
terns and number of MOCA nodes. Therefore in this section, we only present the results for varying
k with a ﬁxed maximum speed of 20 m/s and varying maximum speed with a ﬁxed k = 15.
5.2 Success Ratio
Success ratio for pure ﬂooding stays higher than 98% under all crypto threshold values in the
1km by 1km scenario, showing the eﬀectiveness of ﬂooding as a manycast communication protocol
(Figure 2 (a)). Scoped-ﬂooding also maintains a high success ratio between 96% and 99%. The
success ratio for scoped ﬂooding is at its lowest with k = 15 when many scoped-ﬂooding attempts
fail because of the stale information in the hopcount cache. Success ratio again increases as k grows
larger than 15 because there is not enough information cached at the client and the client falls
back to pure ﬂooding. A similar pattern is ampliﬁed in Figure 3 (a) since the larger area and the
lower node density aﬀect the success ratio adversely.
Both ﬂooding and scoped-ﬂooding are not aﬀected by the mobility until the maximum node
speed reaches 20 m/s. With mobile nodes traveling faster than 20 m/s, the success ratio of scoped-
ﬂooding degrades down to 52% under an extreme maximum speed of 50 m/s (Figure 2 (b)). This
shows the eﬀect of having stale information in the client’s cache due to high mobility, which results
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in more failed scoped-ﬂooding attempts. Figure 3 (b) shows a similar pattern in the 2km by 2km
scenario.
The eﬀectiveness of the MOCA framework is demonstrated with these results. MOCA is capable
of providing almost perfect availability under reasonable network conditions and the performance
gradually degrades as the network condition becomes pathological.
5.3 Packet Overhead
To measure the packet overhead for the MOCA framework, we measure the number of total packets
transmitted per request. When a packet is broadcast, it is counted once per hop. Unicast packets
are counted at each hop. While the number of packets per request simply measures the amount of
packet overhead, the number of packets per satisfied request shows the eﬀect of the success ratio.
In Figure 4 (a), both ﬂooding and scoped ﬂooding show little diﬀerence under all k values in the
1km by 1km scenario. For both cases, the number of packets per satisfied request is a little higher
than the number of packets per all requests since only a small portion of certiﬁcation requests fail.
However, Figure 5 (a) shows the power of scoped ﬂooding in a larger area. The packet overhead
of scoped-ﬂooding is less than half of pure ﬂooding in the lower k range. This shows the eﬀect of
localizing manycast transactions by scoped-ﬂooding, which improves the scalability of the overall
framework. As scoped ﬂooding fails more often with k larger than 15, the overhead catches up to
pure ﬂooding.
While ﬂooding shows a similar result under varying mobility in Figure 4 (b), the number of
packets per satisﬁed request for scoped-ﬂooding increases to higher than 500 packets per satisﬁed
request. This shows the limitation of scoped-ﬂooding to cope with very high mobility. Figure 5
(b) displays a similar pattern in a larger area. Again, scoped-ﬂooding performs better in the lower
mobility range but the overhead per satisﬁed request grows very quickly as mobility increases.
These results show that MOCA’s scoped-ﬂooding can eﬀectively suppress the packet overhead
by limiting the certiﬁcation traﬃc to local regions. In small scale scenarios with 1km x 1km area,
scoped-ﬂooding incurs a little lower overhead than pure ﬂooding. However, as the network size
grows, scoped-ﬂooding successfully suppress the overhead explosion from pure ﬂooding. Scoped-
ﬂooding is a highly eﬃcient and scalable approach to provide manycast communication support.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present MOCA, a practical key management framework for ad hoc wireless
networks. We clarify the necessity and the challenge of providing a PKI framework for ad hoc
networks and identify the requirements for such a framework. Based on our observation of the
potential heterogeneity among mobile nodes, we provide an intelligent way to pick a set of CA nodes.
These selected secure nodes are called MOCA nodes and share the responsibility of collectively
providing the CA functionality for an ad hoc network without revealing their identity. To achieve
both strong security and high availability of the MOCA framework, we provide insight into the
secure conﬁguration of threshold cryptography and the observation of a novel communication
pattern named manycast. To minimize the usage of scarce resources in mobile nodes, we develop a
set of eﬃcient and eﬀective manycast communication protocols for mobile nodes to correspond with
the MOCA framework. Our security analysis shows that the MOCA framework can be conﬁgured
to defend against capable attackers and our simulation results show the eﬀectiveness of manycast
communication support.
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There are still several interesting questions to be investigated. It is unclear if the MOCA frame-
work is indeed vulnerable to a traﬃc analysis attack. We plan to study the types of information
that can be inferred from certiﬁcation traﬃc patterns and possible defenses against such attacks.
Also, in this paper, we looked at the scalability issue related to packet overhead. We plan to per-
form a more detailed study on the scalability of manycast routing protocols under diﬀerent node
density, varying network size under a spectrum of network conditions.
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Figure 1: Security Level
Total Number of Mobile Nodes 150
Number of MOCA nodes 30
Area of Network 1000m x 1000m, 2000m x 2000m
Total Simulation Time 600 sec.
Number of Certiﬁcation Requests 10 requests each from 100 non-MOCA nodes
Node Pause Time 0, 10 sec.
Maximum Node Speed 0, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 50 m/s
Crypto Threshold k 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30
Table 1: Simulation Parameters
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Figure 2: Success Ratio in the 1000m x 1000m Scenario
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Figure 3: Success Ratio in the 2000m x 2000m Scenario
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Figure 4: Packet Overhead in the 1000m x 1000m Scenario
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Figure 5: Packet Overhead in the 2000m x 2000m Scenario
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